A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED AUDITABLE AND SECURE VOTING SYSTEM by Kekulandara, Madhukara
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Master's Theses 
2020 
A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED AUDITABLE AND SECURE VOTING 
SYSTEM 
Madhukara Kekulandara 
University of Rhode Island, mkekulandara@uri.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Kekulandara, Madhukara, "A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED AUDITABLE AND SECURE VOTING SYSTEM" (2020). 
Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 1916. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/1916 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED AUDITABLE AND SECURE VOTING SYSTEM
BY
MADHUKARA KEKULANDARA
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE




UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
2020









DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
2020
ABSTRACT
Improving electronic voting systems to provide election security and integrity
while controlling cost has been an area of active research for decades. As a result,
many technological improvements are incorporated into the voting systems used
today. The introduction of technology, however, has not been without issues and
has raised new concerns. One is the possibility of inaccurate election outcomes due
to technical failures of the equipment. Another is the problem of election security
and the possibility of malicious alteration of election results. Yet another concern
is the capability to conduct post-election audits to validate and provide confidence
in election results.
The research reported here applies the features of blockchains and zero-
knowledge protocols to improve the security, integrity, and transparency of elec-
tronic voting systems. This study proposes a new voting algorithm that can be
used as an extension to the existing voting systems to provide evidence about the
accuracy of an election. A prototype system is developed and implemented, and
the system’s security and auditing features are tested. The Rhode Island voting
system is used as a case study in this research. The proposed algorithm is compat-
ible with current election technology and addresses many major concerns about
present voting systems.
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Electronic voting systems have been the subject of active research for decades.
The goal of such work has been to minimize the cost of conducting an election while
maintaining the security and integrity of the election, as well as voter privacy.
These studies have contributed many improvements to the voting systems we use
today. Optical ballot scanners, paperless voting systems, encrypted voting systems
and internet voting systems are some important outcomes of such work.
Many states, including Rhode Island, have adopted and are using these tech-
nologies in elections. Rhode Island decided to move from mechanical lever machines
to optical scan precinct count voting systems in 1997 [1]. The first election to be
conducted over the Internet in the US was the 1996 Reform Party Presidential
primary, in which Internet voting was offered, along with vote-by-mail and vote-
by-phone, as an option to party members who did not attend the party convention
[2]. Georgia became the first state to implement the use of direct recording elec-
tronic voting machines on a statewide basis, deploying the DREs at the same time
in every county [3].
As a result of widespread adoption of electronic voting systems, U.S. elec-
tions currently rely heavily on the quality of the technology used [4]. In the year
2000, a controversial recount occurred during the presidential election in the state
of Florida [5]. During the November 2004 general election in Carteret County,
North Carolina, electronic voting machines lost 4,438 votes [6]. These and many
other incidents involving close races—including a 1978 election for the Rhode Is-
land Senate, one in 1996 for the South Dakota House of Representatives, and a
1988 Massachusetts Senate Democratic primary [7]—have brought the integrity of
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existing voting technologies into question. One of main concerns is the possibil-
ity of inaccurate election outcomes occurring as a result of technical failures of
election equipment. Technical failures and weaknesses in the security also enabled
unauthorized modification of the election process and the final tally. Lack of trans-
parency and the inability to conduct post-election audits cause people to lose their
trust in the election process.
As a result of such concerns, a list of compliance suggestions for electronic
voting, called the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), was issued by
the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in 2005. Many states adopted
these regulations to overcome some of the weaknesses in their voting systems.
For example, Nevada became the first state to mandate that all electronic voting
machines used in federal elections be equipped with printers that produce a voter-
verified paper audit trail [8]. The California Secretary of State, Kevin Shelley,
decertified all touchscreen electronic voting machines in the state and banned their
use in four counties until significant improvements were made to the security of the
systems [9]. Maryland Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., publicly urged voters to
vote by absentee paper ballot instead of using the state’s electronic voting machines
in the November 2006 General Election after problems with the machines emerged
during Maryland’s primary that year [10]. Unfortunately, insufficient changes have
been made to improve the quality of the existing voting systems used by most
states. [4]
Security breaches of existing voting systems fall into two categories of the
voting process: those involving voting machines at the precinct level, and those
involving the centralized servers where the results are aggregated. Machines used
by voters have been viewed as flawed, due mainly to security concerns. Anyone
with physical access to a voting machine can sabotage it, thereby affecting all
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votes cast [1]. In 2011, a group of computer science and security experts on the
Vulnerability Assessment Team at Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois man-
aged to hack a commonly used electronic voting machine using a remote control
that cost less than $11 [11]. This issue becomes even more critical at the backend
of an election system, when the results of voting machines are forwarded to cen-
tral processing centers, where servers that hold the election results are even more
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In December 2005, Black Box Voting, Inc., set up
a demonstration in Leon County, Florida, where computer security experts Harri
Hursti and Herbert Thompson were able to hack into the central vote tabulator
of an electronic voting system and change the outcome of a mock election without
leaving any trace of their actions [12]. This is one of the key areas where blockchain
technology can be beneficial to a voting system.
Another major concern about current voting systems is their capability to
conduct post-election audits of the election results. “A voting system that may
produce accurate results, but provides no way to know whether it did, is inad-
equate. It provides far too many ways for resourceful adversaries to undermine
public confidence in election integrity” [13]. To address this concern, a strat-
egy was introduced by Philip B. Stark and David A. Wagner in 2012 to conduct
evidence-based elections [14]. This strategy involves three main points: use paper
ballots, protect them, and check them. More specifically:
1. Voters must vote by marking paper ballots - either manually or using ballot
marking devices. In either case, there should be a convenient and acces-
sible way for voters to verify their ballots and, when necessary, to mark a
replacement ballot before officially casting their vote.
2. Voted paper ballots must be carefully stored and managed to ensure that no
ballots are added, removed or altered, and procedures should be established
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to provide strong evidence of proper ballot management.
3. Voted ballots also must be checked in robust post-election vote tabulation
audits. This procedure should involve audit judges manually reviewing a
random sample of cast ballots and comparing them to the reported initial
counts before the election results are finalized. These audits should be risk-
limiting audits (RLAs), which are very likely to correct any election outcome
that is incorrect due to a mistabulation of votes. In very close elections, a
full manual count may be required. [13]
The use of paper ballots is strongly recommended as it leaves an auditable
trail. Blockchains, however, can provide viable paperless audit trails as a substitute
for this recommendation. Blockchains are one of the most secure data structures to
hold sensitive information, and incorporate sufficient capabilities to conduct audits
of the information stored in the chain.
The blockchain technology was invented by a person (or group of people)
known as Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [15]. Its most widely known use to date is
in maintaining public transaction ledgers for cryptocurrencies. It is “an open,
distributed ledger that can record transactions between two parties efficiently and
in a verifiable and permanent way” [16]. Blockchains have many features to create
resistance to alteration of the data stored in the blocks. Once recorded, the data in
any given block cannot be altered retroactively without alteration of all subsequent
blocks(See Figure 1), which requires consensus of the network majority.
A blockchain possess four main features:
• The ledger exists in many different locations. Hence it is impossible to tamper
with the content of a blockchain by changing the contents at one location.
• There is distributed control over who can append new transactions to the
4
Figure 1. Alteration of a blockchain
ledger.
• Any proposed “new block” to the ledger must reference the previous state of
the ledger, creating an immutable chain.
• A majority of the network nodes must reach a consensus before a proposed
new block of entries becomes a permanent part of the ledger [17].
To date, the principal use of blockchains has been in cryptocurrency, most no-
tably Bitcoin [15]. However, blockchains are increasingly being used for a number
of other applications because of their inherent resistance to the modification of a
transaction, block, or the entire distributed ledger [18]. Mediachain is a peer-to-
peer, decentralized database for sharing information across applications and orga-
nizations [19]. Propy is a Silicon Valley-based Cryptocurrency Company working
towards modernizing the real estate industry through the use of Blockchain tech-
nology [20].
Blockchain technology provides a potential solution to many security problems
associated with voting systems:
1. Inherent resistance to modification can be used as a shield against any at-
tempt at tampering with the recorded votes.
2. Since the ledger exists in many different locations, cyberattacks on a single
server will not cause the entire system to fail.
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3. A consensus is required before new block entries become permanent, avoiding
the addition of illegal blocks (votes) to the chain.
4. Blockchains also provide a capability to conduct election audits even when
no paper trail is available.
Introducing new technologies into a system that already suffers from techno-
logical failures might not be a feasible solution. A new voting algorithm purely
based on a blockchain network that uses coins as votes will create new security
challenges rather than solving the existing ones [21]. Despite that, we can still use
some of the key features in blockchains like proof of work, consensus mechanism,
and hash links to create a partially decentralized chain of ballots that can provide
proofs to the results posted by the existing voting system. These proofs can be
used as evidence to validate the elections or to identify any attempt of malicious
activity during an election.
This research addresses the use of features in blockchains and zero-knowledge
protocols to improve the security, integrity and the transparency of electronic
voting systems. The goal is to design an extension to the existing election system
that will improve the security and integrity of current ones, while at the same time
facilitating the auditing of election results. The Rhode Island voting system is used
as the case study because of our familiarity with it and our ability to ask questions
to local voting authorities as they arise. Another of our goals is to introduce a
minimum of changes to existing voting systems and that are compatible with the
current election process.
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In this chapter, the most prominent voting systems that influenced our work
are surveyed. The ballot structure, the voting process, and auditing capabilities
of each system are described briefly. This chapter also discusses the auditing
requirements necessary for an election in Rhode Island and presents a description
of the machines used in the state. At the end of the chapter, a brief introduction
to all the technologies used in our work is presented.
2.1 Voting Systems
2.1.1 Aperio
Aperio is a paper-based voting system that allows the creation of verifiable
audit trails without involving any cryptographic methods. It is an ‘end-to-end’ in-
tegrity verification mechanism that can be used in secret paper-ballot environments
without the use of sophisticated election machines.
Aperio uses a randomized candidate order on each ballot paper. This allows
the generation of a set of paper receipts with the voter’s mark in its proper location,
but without exposing candidate names. As a result, it provides auditability while
maintaining voter privacy. This system was first presented at the WOTE2008
conference by Aleks Essex et. al. of the University of Ottawa as a way to conduct
high integrity elections in countries that have limited access to technology [1].
Aperio uses a stack of ballot papers instead of a single paper ballot. This
stack is referred to as the “ballot assembly”. It consists of four (or more) sheets of
paper separated by carbon paper. In this stack, the first sheet is the ballot itself
with the candidate names in randomized order. This sheet includes ovals where
votes are marked. On the second sheet, a serial number is printed along with the
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ovals in the same position as the first sheet, but there are no candidate names. The
second sheet is a receipt that a voter retains and can use to verify his/her vote.
The last two sheets are audit sheets containing commitment reference numbers
that are used during the audit process. Like the second sheet, they include the
marked ovals without the candidate names. (See Figure 2)
Figure 2. Aperio ballot assembly
There is no limit to the number of audit sheets in the stack. There can be as
many audit sheets as desired, one for each group of auditors. When the top ballot
is marked, the mark carries through all the ballot sheets because of the carbon
paper.
Before election day, two commitment lists are created by the election authority.
The ballot commitment list holds information concerning the candidate order for
each ballot assembly. The receipt commitment list holds a serial number associated
with each ballot assembly. These lists are exposed to the public depending on the
type of audits conducted after the election. To conduct a secure audit, only one
of these lists is ever revealed. The other is destroyed during the auditing process.
On election day, a voter marks choices on the top ballot and then separates
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the ballot assembly. The top sheet goes into a ballot box, the voter retains the
second sheet as a receipt, and the audit sheets go into corresponding audit boxes.
Aperio is capable of conducting three types of audits: receipt audits, tally
audits, and ballot audit. These are discussed later in this chapter.
2.1.2 Scantegrity II
Scantegrity II is an end-to-end cryptographic voting system created for use
with optical scan voting technology. The basic principle of this system is the
use of secret codes, called confirmation codes, that are printed in invisible ink on
the ballot. Voters reveal an invisible code by marking the intended oval on the
ballot. After casting a vote, a voter can check this code on a bulletin board to
be confident his vote was counted and included in the final tally. Scantegrity was
originally proposed by David Chaum in 2007 [2]. Scantegrity II, introduced in
2009, became somewhat of a success and was used in a governmental election held
in Tacoma Park, Maryland [3].
Figure 3. Scantegrity II ballot structure
As shown in Figure 3, a voter wishing to verify his vote can write down the
confirmation code appearing in the oval on the receipt and take it home. Unlike
Aperio, in Scantegrity II candidate names appear in the same order on every ballot,
but there is a unique serial number on every ballot.
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The serial number of the ballot and all the secret codes on it are stored in a
table referred to as the “ballot table” (Figure 4: Table P). Since this table exposes
the relationship between the confirmation code and a candidate, it must never be
published. As a result, three commitment tables are created for use in audits: The
“permuted ballot table”, the “shuffle table”, and the “result table”.
• The permuted ballot table holds the confirmation codes for each ballot with-
out the candidate’s name. To maintain secrecy, the codes are permuted to
change the order they appear on the ballot. (Figure 4: Table Q)
• The shuffle table holds details of the confirmation codes printed in invisible
ink on each ballot. It also holds a pointer to the result table mapping each
candidate’s vote to the ballot serial number from which the vote originates.
(Figure 4: Table R)
• The Result table holds the final tally of the election. (Figure 4: Table S)
Figure 4. Scantegrity II commitment tables
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Scantegrity II has capabilities for conducting receipt audits, ballot audits, pre-
election cut and choose audits, tally audits, and post-election randomized partial
checking (RPC) audits.
2.1.3 Helios
Helios is an open-source voting system for strictly online elections. This sys-
tem is based on public-key cryptography and has an auditing capability. A primary
goal of this project was to create a platform enabling anyone to set up and conduct
a completely online election. The Helios system was created in 2008 by Ben Adida
at MIT [4].
Internet voting is considered by most as an insecure way to conduct elections
due to security and privacy vulnerabilities, as well as the lack of a paper ballot
trail. As a result, Adida does not endorse Helios for elections that involve high
stakes. He suggests this system for schools and clubs conducting low-stakes online
elections where there is little or consequence of a cyber-attack.
The Helios system has been successfully used on many occasions. In March
2009 it was deployed in the election of the President of Université Catholique de
Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium [4]. It was also used to run the Princeton
undergraduate student government election in October 2009.
Since Helios is designed for online elections, the ballots are created as virtual
web forms. Cast ballots are encrypted using the El Gamal cryptosystem before
being sent back to a server for inclusion in the tally. The private key needed to
decrypt a ballot is saved on a trusted workstation. The Helios system is capable of
conducting three types of audits: ballot audits, receipt audits, and tally audits [5].
A ballot audit is performed on the virtual ballots by displaying the SHA-1 hash
ciphertext of the ballot to the voter.
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2.1.4 Prêt à Voter
This system was created by Peter Ryan at Newcastle University in 2004.
Like Aperio, it uses a randomized candidate order to provide verifiability while
maintaining ballot secrecy [6].
A Prêt à Voter ballot has two halves that can be separated in the middle.
The left side is printed with a list of random candidates. And the right-side has
boxes where the voter marks his intention with a pen. The right-side also has a
2D bar code containing the information necessary to decrypt the candidate order
printed on the left-side. See Figure 5. The key to decrypting the candidate order
is encrypted in such a way that no one person alone can decrypt the ballot.
Figure 5. Prêt à Voter ballot
On election day, voters mark their ballots with an “X” using a pen on the right
side of the paper, detach the left side from the ballot, and discard it; the right-side
is scanned using an optical scanner that records and adds the vote to the tally.
Voters leave the polling place with the right side of the ballot as a receipt.
The Prêt à Voter system is capable of conducting four types of audits: ballot
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audits, receipt audits, tally audits, and post-election mixnet audits.
2.1.5 WAVERI
WAVERI is an election algorithm based on set theory. The name WAVERI
stands for Watch, Audit, Verify Elections for Rhode Island. This algorithm offers a
solution that creates verifiable audit trails without the added complexity associated
with cryptographic schemes. The algorithm was created in 2011 by Suzanne I.
Mello-Stark at the University of Rhode Island [7].
Prior to election day, the algorithm creates a set of unique codes and saves
them on a precinct’s election system. On election day, the algorithm secretly
divides the audit code set into a family of disjoint subsets. One subset is assigned
to each candidate in every race. When a vote is cast, an audit code is removed
from the selected candidate’s subset and placed in the used audit code set. The
audit code is printed for the voter to take home for later verification. Since the
original candidate subsets are never exposed, the audit code cannot be linked to a
specific candidate. Final vote tallies for each candidate are calculated by looking
into the unused audit codes in each candidate’s subsets.
WAVERI system is capable of conducting four types of audits: receipt audits,
tally audits, randomized partial checking audit, and complete set audit
2.2 Election Auditing Methods
2.2.1 Ballot Audits
A ballot audit is used to verify the ballots are printed correctly. A voter or
an auditor can conduct a ballot audit on election day. To begin a ballot audit, the
interested party asks a poll worker for a blank ballot. The poll worker marks a
ballot as an “audit ballot” and hands it to the auditor for verification [7].
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2.2.2 Receipt Audits
A receipt audit allows voters and watchdog groups to make sure all the re-
ceipts are included in the final tally. After the election day, an auditing group
collects ballot receipts from voters and compares the collected receipts with the
corresponding ballots. Any missing ballots during the election can be identified
using this audit [7].
2.2.3 Tally Audits
A tally audit gives auditors another way to verify the vote tally. There are
various methods to perform this audit based on the voting system. The main goal
is to provide evidence of the correctness of the final tally.
2.3 Risk Limiting Audits
In October 2017, the Governor of Rhode Island signed into law a groundbreak-
ing election security measure requiring Rhode Island election officials to conduct
risk-limiting audits (RLAs) staring with the 2020 presidential primary [8]. Ac-
cording to this law, election officials must conduct an RLA on a random sample of
cast ballots determined by statistical modeling instead of auditing a predetermined
number of ballots [8].
There are three different approaches to risk-limiting audits.
• Ballot-level comparison: a random sample of cast ballots is manually in-
terpreted, and each manual interpretation is checked against the machine
interpretation of the same ballot.
• Ballot polling: a random sample of voted ballots is manually interpreted,
and the resulting manual vote counts are checked against the total machine
counts to see if they provide strong statistical evidence that the reported
outcome is correct. This method is very similar to exit polling.
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• Batch level comparison: a random sample of “batches” is selected, and the
votes in each batch are counted manually. A batch may consist of all the
ballots cast in a precinct, or on a particular voting machine. The counts are
compared to the corresponding precinct or machine counts, batch by batch,
to determine any discrepancies.
2.4 Voting Machines in Rhode Island
2.4.1 ES&S DS200
The ES&S DS200 is a precinct-based, voter-activated paper ballot counter and
tabulator. The DS200 has a 12” LCD touch screen that provides voters with feed-
back, such as an overvote warning. When the polls close, the ES&S DS200 prints
out logs providing election officials with a paper tally of the votes cast. The DS200
captures digitized images of all ballots scanned. Write-in votes and problematic
ballot markings can be processed using the digitized images. Consequently, once
the ballots are scanned, they need not be handled except in the event of a recount
or audit [9]. This system is used as the ballot scanner at all polling places in Rhode
Island elections. All ballots are marked by hand or, for accessibility purposes, an
AutoMark device.
Figure 6. ES&S DS200 voting machine
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2.4.2 ES&S DS850
The DS850 is a high-speed, digital scan ballot tabulator designed for use by
election officials at a central election facility. The DS850 can scan and count
up to 300 ballots per minute. It uses digital cameras and imaging systems to
read the front and back of each ballot, evaluate the result, and sort each ballot
into an appropriate tray based on the result to maintain continuous scanning and
tabulating. Multiple criteria can be used to segregate ballots for review including
overvotes, crossover votes, and blank ballots. Depending on the situation, ballots
segregated in this fashion may not be counted and may need to be remade by the
election inspectors. Rhode Island mainly uses these systems for mail and absentee
ballot tabulation [10].
Figure 7. ES&S DS850 voting machine
2.4.3 ES&S AutoMARK
The AutoMARK Voter Assist Terminal (VAT) is an optical scan ballot marker
designed for use by people who are unable to mark an optical scan ballot due to
physical impairments or language barriers. Originally patented by Eugene Cum-
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mings in 2003, ES&S purchased the rights to manufacture and distribute the sys-
tems in 2008 [11].
Figure 8. ES&S AutoMARK ballot marking device
2.5 Blockchain Technology
The first-ever blockchain-like protocol was proposed by cryptographer David
Chaum in his 1982 dissertation, “Computer Systems Established, Maintained, and
Trusted by Mutually Suspicious Groups”[13]. This work was continued in 1991
by Stuart Haber and W. Scott Stornetta into a cryptographically secured chain of
blocks [12]. Their goal was implementing a system where document timestamps
could not be tampered.
In 2008, the notion of blockchain was conceptualized by a person (or group of
people) known as Satoshi Nakamoto [13]. Nakamoto’s design used a Hashcash-like
method to timestamp blocks without requiring them to be signed by a trusted
party [14]. In the following year, Nakamoto introduced a cryptocurrency called
Bitcoin, where blockchain technology serves as the basis for implementing a public
ledger used to support this digital currency [13].
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A blockchain is a system of recording information in a way that makes it
difficult or impossible to change, hack, or cheat the system [15]. A blockchain
ledger exists in many different locations. Hence it is impossible to tamper with the
content of a blockchain by changing the information stored at just one location.
There is distributed control over who can append new transactions to the ledger.
Any proposed “new block” in the ledger must reference its previous state, creating
an immutable chain. A majority of the network nodes must reach a consensus
before any proposed new block of entries becomes a permanent part of the ledger.
To date, the principal use of blockchains has been in cryptocurrency, mainly
Bitcoin. However, blockchains are increasingly being used in other applications
including “smart contracts” [16], financial services, video games, energy trading,
supply chains, and domain name registration [17].
2.6 Proof of Work
A proof-of-work (POW) system (or protocol, or function) is a consensus mech-
anism whose main purpose is to prevent denial-of-service attacks and other abuses
such as spam on a computer network. A service requester is required to perform
some work, usually equating to computer processing time, in order to receive a
requested service. The concept was invented by Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor
in a 1993 journal article [18]. The term “proof of work” was first introduced and
formalized in 1999 by Markus Jakobsson and Ari Juels [19].
A key feature of proof-of-work schemes is their asymmetry. The work must
be moderately hard, though feasible, for the requester to perform, but easy for
the service provider to check. This notion is also known as a CPU cost function,
client puzzle, computational puzzle, or CPU pricing function. It is different from
a CAPTCHA, which is intended for a human to solve quickly while being difficult
for a computer to solve.
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2.7 Related Technologies
2.7.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function, or hashing algorithm, takes a block of data and
operates on it in a deterministic fashion to scramble the information and produce
a much smaller fixed-size string called a hash value. A good hash function should
have the property that it is infeasible for two distinct data blocks to produce the
same hash value. These functions were originally invented in the 1950s to detect
errors in communications [20].
One of the first hash functions to gain acceptance was MD5, developed by Ron
Rivest in 1991 [21]. A pair of strings producing the same value was reported in 2004
and several other collisions have been found since [22]. Consequently, the method
is no longer considered strongly collision-resistant and MD5 is not recommended
for use in secure applications.
SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) is a widely used hash function designed by
the NSA. Although this method produces a much larger 160-bit hash, collisions
were reported in 2005 and 2008 [23].
SHA-2 and SHA256 are newer versions of the SHA-1 hash algorithm. SHA256
produces a 256-bit (32 bytes) hash value that is usually reported as 64-digit hex-
adecimal number.
2.7.2 Zero-knowledge Proof
Zero-knowledge proof (protocol) is a method by which one party (the prover)
can demonstrate to another (the verifier) that they know a value x, without con-
veying any information apart from the fact that they know the value x [26]. The
base of this technique is to use mathematical methods to verify things without
sharing or revealing underlying data.
This method was initially introduced in 1989 by Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Mi-
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cali, and Charles Rackoff in their paper “The Knowledge Complexity of Interac-
tive Proof-Systems” [28]. It has been successfully used in many areas including
authentication systems, to enforce ethical behavior (according to community stan-
dards) among members of an online community, nuclear disarmament, and the
blockchain.
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CHAPTER 3
A Blockchain-Based Voting Algorithm
A new voting algorithm that builds upon characteristics of blockchains is
presented in this chapter. The procedure builds on other cryptographic techniques
as well, including the El-Gamal public key encryption system and zero-knowledge
protocols. This new algorithm offers advantages over current voting systems in
terms of security and its ability to facilitate audits.
3.1 The Voting Process
On election day, each voter receives an unmarked paper ballot with no iden-
tifying index on it. This ballot follows the format now used in the state of Rhode
Island. Hence there is no need to change or reconfigure the optical scanning devices
currently used.
Voters mark their intentions on the ballot in the same manner currently used.
After marking the ballot, they insert it into a ballot scanner. The scanners perform
an initial validation to check for overvotes and other incorrectly marked ballots.
Rhode Island elections currently uses ES&S DS200 optical scanners at polling
places, and these machines have built-in features to detect incorrectly marked
ballots and overvotes. If the scanner approves a ballot as correctly marked, it
places the ballot into a bin attached to the scanner.
In our scheme, the scanner forwards the information on the ballot to a server
located within the polling place to which it is ”hard-wired”. We refer to this
server as the “validator”, and its primary function is to store the information on
all ballots cast in the precinct into a blockchain. After successfully saving the vote
into the blockchain, the validator prints out a QR code on a printer attached to
it. This QR code serves as the receipt for a particular ballot, and the voter can
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take it home and use it to verify that his or her vote appears in the blockchain.
Figure 9. Voting process
3.2 Validator Authentication
Before storing a vote in the local chain, a validator performs a process called
“proof of work” to generate the correct hash for the block representing the new
ballot. Each hash generated by the validator needs to be formatted in a particular
way. To achieve this format, a validator uses a random value called a nonce. This
value is generated for each individual ballot by a secured workstation located in a
centralized operation center. We refer to this workstation as the “central server”.
For security reasons validators do not store this random value in their memory and
need to request it from the central server for each ballot.
To avoid unauthorized access to the central server, validators need to authen-
ticate themselves to the central server. This authentication process is performed
using a Fiat-Shamir zero-knowledge protocol [1]. The reason for using this proto-
col is to provide authentication without sharing any sensitive information between
validators and the central server. This protects validators from network eavesdrop-
ping attacks.
The authentication process works as follows. Before the election, each valida-
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tor and the central server generate private and public encryption/decryption keys
using El-Gamal protocol [2]. This process is performed offline at a central election
facility. The key distribution process is as follows:
1. First, both the central server and all of the validators agree on two values, a
prime number n and a random value g. The central server and all validators
use the same pair of values.
2. Next, the central server generates a random value a and computes A = ga
mod n. The value a is the central server’s “password” and A is its “user-
name”. The central server shares the value of A with all the validators and
keeps a secret.
3. Each validator follows the same process, generating a random “password” b
and “username” B = gb mod n. Every validator keeps its b value secret and
sends its username to the central server, which stores the B values for each
validator separately.
4. The central server uses the B value as the “username” for each validator in
the Fiat-Shamir authentication process. It also computes Ba mod n, which
it uses as the public key to encrypt the proof of work it shares with a validator
after successful authentication.
5. Each validator computes Ab mod n and uses it as the decryption key to
decrypt the proof of work it receives from the central server after a successful
authentication process.
On election day, each validator requests a new proof of work for every ballot.
Before requesting a proof of work, a validator goes through a zero-knowledge check
to authenticate itself to the central server. This process works as follows:
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1. The validator selects a random value v and uses it to generate T = gv mod n,
which it passes to the central server as its initial request for authentication.
2. The central server keeps the T value and responds to the request with a
randomly generated value C.
3. The validator uses the equation R = v − Cb based on the value C returned
from the server and its secret password b. It forwards R as the second request
in the authentication process.
4. The central server uses R, the previously generated value C and the valida-
tor’s username B to generate U = gRBC mod n .
5. If the value U is equal to the value T from the initial request, the central
server accepts the proof of work request from the validator and establishes a





U = gv = T
The information shared by the central server consists of two parts. The first is
the proof of work, a random number (nonce) use to format the hash. The second
is a timestamp bearing the time the central server generated the proof of work.
These two values are encrypted before sharing them with the validator. The
central server uses the public key of the validator to encrypt the data. The validator
uses its private key to decrypt the proof of work.
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Figure 10. Validator authentication process
3.3 Proof of Work
Proof of work (POW) is the mechanism that protects the integrity of the
information stored in the local chain. Blockchain technology provides an inherit
resistance to alteration of data in the chain [3]. This resistance is achieved by
storing the previous state of the chain, in the form of a hash value, in every block
before the block is allowed to become a permanent part of the chain. The resistance
is compromised, however, if someone tries to replace the entire blockchain with a
new one. The concept of proof of work is used to protect against such attacks on
the local chains stored in validators.
After authenticating a validator, the central server generates a random value
(cryptographic nonce) and sends it back to the validator. The POW concept is
based on this random number and “vote id”, initially assigned a value of 0, that is
stored in each block. The central server saves the newly generated nonce with the
name of the validator that requested it and the time of the request in a POW log.
This log is stored securely on the central server and is used to conduct post-election
audits.
Since the POW generation algorithm is based on random numbers, a hacker
with the same algorithm cannot predict the nonce generated by the central server
in response to a specific request. The central server is the only place where the
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Figure 11. Proof of work log
nonce is stored in the entire system.
Figure 12. Block structure
Each block consists of four data fields as shown in Figure 12. The previous
hash comes from the hash of the last block in the local chain, the ballot data is
the information received from the ballot scanner, the POW timestamp is sent by
the central server, and the vote id is the number used by the validator to generate
and format the hash of the new block.
The POW is based on the validator generating a SHA256 has that begins with
a binary sequence of 0s followed by a 1. See Figure 13. The number of 0s in the
sequence determines the difficulty of the POW. The number of attempts required
by the validator to find a hash with the correct format increases as the number of
0s increases. A feasible value for the number of 0s needs to be set before the start
of the election. This value is static for all the blocks in every local chain during
the election.
Figure 13. Hash format
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To achieve the desired format, a validator adds the nonce value to the vote
id. The validator generates a hash for the block combining all four data fields. If
the hash is not in the expected format, the validator increases the vote id by one
and generates another hash. The validator continues this process until it finds a
hash of the correct format. When this hash is found, the validator generates a new
block in the local chain. This block includes the data combined to generate the
hash, but the vote id is altered by deducting the nonce. For example, if the server
sends 152345 as the nonce, and the validator took 120 attempts to find a hash of
the correct format, the vote id used to generate the correct hash is 152345 + 120
= 152465. But the validator stores 120 as the value for the vote id in the new
block. As a result, validators retain no information about the nonce values used
to generate each block.
After storing the block into the local chain, the validator uses the hash to
generate a QR code that is printed on a piece of paper that voters can take home
as a receipt of their vote. Voters can use this QR code to verify their vote has
been included in the local chain. This voter verification process is referred to as a
receipt audit.
3.4 Genesis Block
Recall that each block in the local chain stores the previous state of the chain
in the form of a hash value. The problem is that each chain needs to start with
a block that does not refer to a previous hash. This block is referred to as the
“genesis block” of the chain. This special block is placed in each validator to mark
the starting point of the local chain, and does not have any value for the “previous
hash” and “ballot data” fields. Before election day, the central server generates a
list of nonces and assigns each nonce to a genesis block in every validator. Each
validator executes the POW procedure described above with null ballot data, a null
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previous hash, and a timestamp for the nonce and to generate a “genesis block”.
3.5 Voter Verification (Receipt Audit)
The main purpose of the voter verification process is to create an audit trail
for each vote. Voters can also use it as evidence to verify their vote is included in
the final tally.
After the conclusion of an election and the posting of the results, voters can
access the vote verification system using the receipt they were given at the polls.
Voters can use their smartphones or a QR code scanner to access the verification
portal through an online website. After scanning the receipt, voters are directed
to the verification portal for their precinct, where the system will confirm that
their ballot was included in the tally. This confirmation does not reveal any detail
about how the ballot was cast, just that the vote has been included in the election
count.
3.6 Post-election Audits
The Rhode Island Board of Elections is now, under law, required to perform
risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for certain elections [4]. Risk limiting audits can be
of three principal types: ballot level comparison, ballot pooling, and batch level
comparison. The system proposed here provides sufficient features to conduct all
three types of RLAs.
3.6.1 Ballot Level Comparison
Since we have a separate chain for each precinct, this can be used to produce
a separate final tally for each precinct. After the election, precincts can be selected
randomly and the ballots for a precinct can be rescanned using a different scanner
and validator to create a new chain. By generating the final tally for the new chain
and comparing it to the original tally, we can evaluate the validity of the scanner
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and validator used in the precinct. To improve the accuracy of the process, it can
be repeated for different precincts.
Furthermore, we can manually evaluate a sample of ballots (e.g., 10%) from
the precinct and project the election outcome for that precinct based on the tally
of the sample. This is useful in verifying there are no programming issues related
to ballot-scanning and processing the information on ballots.
3.6.2 Ballot Pooling
Sets of blocks from a precinct chain can be randomly selected to create a
sample of ballots. By evaluating the information stored in each block, the vote
count for the sample can be determined. This information can be used to estimate
the final tally of the precinct, providing a projection of the election count. The
same process can be performed manually by visually inspecting and counting the
actual ballot papers (instead of using blocks in the chain) from a random sample
of votes to provide an estimation of the final election tally.
3.6.3 Batch Level Comparison
This is one of the easiest audits to perform with our current design. Since
the system provides the local blockchains for each precinct separately, they can be
used as the batches. When the results for all precincts are added together, this
should generate the final count for the election. We can select a random sample
of precinct local chains and evaluate the tally of each chain to generate the final
tally of the sample. This information can be used to estimate the final tally of the
election. The count from the sample can be compared to the original tally from
the logs generated by the voting machines.
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3.6.4 Block Removal Method
In this procedure, a random set of blocks are removed from a precinct chain.
The tally of the removed blocks and the rest of the blocks left in the chain is
evaluated. The sum of the two tallies needs to be equal to the original final tally
of the chain. The final tally can be validated with the equation in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Block removal audit equation
This method provides mathematical proof of the tally in each precinct.
3.6.5 Block Connectivity Audit
In addition to the above audits, we can use the features of the blockchains to
perform post-election audits. The validity of each link in the chain can be verified
from the “previous hash” value of the next block and the four pieces of information
stored in the current block: the ballot data, timestamp, vote id, and the hash of the
previous block. Verifying the validity of the links provides evidence that the local
chain has not been maliciously altered. If the hash in either of the two consecutive
blocks is incorrect, the connectivity check will fail.
3.6.6 Block Authenticity Audit
The proof of work for each block can also be used to validate the integrity of the
chain. The timestamp stored in each block can be used to locate the corresponding
POW (nonce) in the central server’s log. After adding the nonce value to the
vote id value in the block, we can regenerate the hash of a block and check that
the format of the hash is correct. By performing this test on all blocks in the chain,
we can validate the integrity of the entire chain.
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Implementation and testing of this research were conducted in two phases.
In the first phase, a prototype was implemented based on the voting algorithm
described in Chapter 3. In the second phase, three mock elections were conducted
to test the system.
The first mock election tested the functionality of certain features in the sys-
tem such as the zero-knowledge protocol, El-Gamal encryption, and proof of work.
Only one precinct and a small number (less than 20) ballots were used in this mock
election. No post-election audits were conducted due to an insufficient amount of
data in the chain.
The second mock election analyzed the computational complexity of the pro-
posed proof of work procedure to determine a feasible length for the sequence of 0s
used in the proof of work. Only one precinct was used, and up to 100 votes tested
for each length to collect data.
The third mock election replicated an actual election with two precincts. Up
to 1000 ballots were used for each precinct. All the post-election audit methods
were tested including voter verification. The findings of each mock election are
presented at the end of this chapter.
4.1 Blockchain Voting Prototype
Actual ES&S DS200 optical scanners were not acquired for use in the proto-
type. Instead, the software was developed to simulate the functionality of a ballot
scanner, a validator, and the central server. A webform developed using HTML
and JavaScript was used for ballots. A web API (REST API) developed using the
Python Flask framework was used to send the ballot data to the validator. Each
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ballot was converted to a JSON object and stored inside the block as the value for
the “ballot data”.
Figure 15. Online ballot form
The validator was implemented in Python, and the local chains were stored
inside a validator as a binary file. All the algorithms (zero-knowledge protocol,
El-Gamal encryption, and proof of work) used in the validator were implemented
from scratch without using any third-party Python libraries. The built-in Python
library “hashlib” was used to perform the SHA256 hash function.
Features of the central server were also implemented in python on the same
server as the validator. The validator authentication process (zero-knowledge pro-
tocol) and the encryption of the data shared between the central server and the
validator were implemented as described in Chapter 3. The proof of work log was
also stored on the server as a binary file.
A separate tallying function was implemented to calculate the result of votes
received by the validator. This function was written to replicate the tallying feature
of an ES&S DS200 optical scanner. A separate web API was developed using the
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Python Flask framework to view the final result of the election. The API returns
a web page with the current tally of votes.
Figure 16. Tally API page
The voter verification process also faced minor changes from the original design
due to the absence of actual validators attached to a QR printer. Instead of printing
a receipt with the QR code, a QR code image was displayed on the online ballot
page after a successfully cast vote. This image can be downloaded or printed on
paper to use as a receipt to access the voter verification portal. As in the original
design, this image can be scanned using a camera on a smartphone or a QR code
scanner. The scanned image reveals a link to access the voter verification portal,
which is a web API developed using the same Python Flask framework as the tally
API. This API informs the voter that their vote is included in the final tally.
Post-elections audits were implemented as Python scripts. These scripts access
the data stored in a binary file to perform the validations necessary to provide
evidence of the accuracy of the election. The processes of voter verification and
post-election audits are explained further in the following sections.
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Figure 17. Vote verification QR code
4.2 First Mock Election
As previously mentioned, the main purpose of the first mock election was to
test the key features of the voting algorithm. This mock election was designed
to exercise functions such as generating public and private encryption keys for
validators using El-Gamal key generation, authenticating validators to the central
server with the Fiat-Shamir zero-knowledge protocol, and validating hashes using
proof of work.
This mock election was conducted using a single precinct. Only one virtual
validator was used to record votes. An online ballot form was designed to ac-
commodate one race with three options to vote: two candidates plus a space for
a write-in. Several votes were added to the chain representing all the options to
check the success of the vote casting process.
All the keys and passwords required to perform the zero-knowledge protocol
and data encryption were manually generated before the test and stored as fixed
values inside the code.
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4.2.1 El-Gamal Key Generation
For El-Gamal key generation, the central server and each of the validators
need to agree upon two values: a prime number n and a random number g, where
g is preferably a generator mod n (i.e., the powers of g mod n run through the
numbers 1, 2, . . ., n–1 in some order). In the first mock test, 11881379 was the
prime n and 1567892 was the value of g. These two values were saved inside both
the central server and the validator. Then a random value a = 15467 was selected
as the private key of the central server. By using the equation A = ga mod n, the
public key for the validator was calculated and shared with all the validators.
A = ga mod n
A = 156789215467 mod 11881379
A = 11170411
The same process was repeated to generate private and public keys for the
validator. Random value b = 76543 was selected as the private key for the validator
and the public key was calculated and shared with the central server.
B = gb mod n
B = 156789276543 mod 11881379
B = 748829
This B value is also used as the validator’s username for the Fiat-Shamir zero-
knowledge protocol. The encryption key was generated in the central server using
the equation Ba mod n
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Encryptkey = Ba mod n
Encryptkey = 748829815467 mod 11881379
Encryptkey = 5956664
Similarly, the decryption key was generated for each validator using the equa-
tion Ab mod n.
Decryptkey = Ab mod n
Decryptkey = 1117041176543 mod 11881379
Decryptkey = 5956664
4.2.2 Fiat-Shamir Zero-Knowledge Protocol
To test for successful validator authentication with the Fiat-Shamir zero-
knowledge protocol, seven votes were added to the system using the fixed key
values generated in the previous section for the validator. After adding the votes
to the system, the local chain stored in the validator was retrieved to check whether
all the votes were successfully recorded in the chain. The retrieved data showed
the local chain held eight blocks, the genesis block plus one block for each of the
seven votes cast. All the votes were successfully turned into blocks and stored in
the chain (Figure 18). Hence the validator successfully authenticated itself to the
central server for each vote cast without sharing any other information.
The system was also tested to be sure that an invalid authentication is detected
and prevented. This was tested by using incorrect values for the username of the
validator. To do so, the public key of the validator on the central server was
changed to the incorrect value 5830. As with the previous test, several votes were
added to the system to test the process. In this case, no votes were recorded in
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Figure 18. Local ballot chain
the local chain and an error message was flagged in the program log to indicate
the invalid login attempt. See Figure 19 and Figure 20.
Figure 19. Server authentication error message
4.2.3 El-Gamal Data Encryption
A similar test was conducted to validate the El-Gamal data encryption pro-
cess. First, several votes were added to the system. Then the nonce values in
the pow log file on the central server were checked against the program log to en-
sure the validator received the correct nonces for each vote. A fail scenario was
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Figure 20. Server authentication error log
also tested by changing the private key of the validator to an incorrect value. A
comparison between the generated hash and the corresponding pow for the block
revealed the hashes generated with an invalid decryption key did not follow the
correct pow rules.
The El-Gamal encryption test also provides evidence to demonstrate the suc-
cess of the proof of work algorithm. All the hashes generated on the validator when
the correct private key was used successfully followed the proof of work rule. The
proof of work procedure is repeated until a validator finds a hash with the correct
number of 0s. Figure 21 shows the last six hashes that did not match the pow rule
and the final one which successfully matched the rule. The program accepts this
last hash as a valid hash.
In addition to this information, the first mock election also revealed the success
of storing and retrieving vote information and pow data in binary files. For the
first mock election, a value of 16 was used as the length of the sequence of 0s
needed to be followed by each hash. This number was selected to reduce the time
required to generate the hash. Each successful hash was generated in an average
time of 2020 milliseconds per nonce. The average number of guesses to generate a
correct hash was 141212 tries.
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Figure 21. Hash generation process
4.3 Second Mock Election
The main purpose of the second mock election was to analyze the computa-
tional complexity of the proposed proof of work algorithm. The mock election was
designed to determine the average number of attempts to find a correct hash as a
function of the number of leading 0s. The test was conducted for seven different
lengths starting from 8 to 20 in increments of two. For each length, 100 votes
were added to the system using an API automation tool. The average number
of attempts needed to format the hash was recorded along with the average time
to generate a hash. The results of this test are shown in Table 1 and the graphs
appearing in Figure 22 (average number of attempts) and Figure 23 (average time).
Based on these results, a value of 16 was selected as a feasible value for the
number of 0s, and this value was used for the mock elections described in the next
section.
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Table 1. Proof of work performance analysis result
Figure 22. Average number of attempts vs length
4.4 Third Mock Election
The third mock election was conducted to simulate an actual election envi-
ronment. Two precincts were used, each with its own validator and chain of votes.
One reason for using two validators was to test the voter verification process and
batch level comparison auditing. Approximately 1000 simulated ballots were cast
for each precinct using an API automation tool. The same ballot structure was
used as in the previous mock elections. The ballot consisted of one race with three
options to vote: two candidates, and space for write-ins. Slightly biased ballot data
was created for each precinct. All the votes were added to the system directly using
the API instead of using the online ballot form.
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Figure 23. Average time vs length
Risk limiting audits and other validations were performed on each voting chain
to analyze the system’s capabilities to conduct post-election audits. The results of
these audits and other artifacts of the election were cross-checked against the tally
API to test the validity of the election results.
For the first precinct, 943 simulated votes were cast, 49% for Candidate A,
40% for Candidate B and the rest were write-ins. See Figure 25.
For the second precinct, 1213 simulated votes were cast, 30% for Candidate
A, 46% for Candidate B and the rest were for write-ins. See Figure 26.
4.4.1 Ballot Level Comparison Audit
A ballot level comparison audit was implemented using a Python script. The
script was written to access the binary file for the local chain from each precinct
separately. A new tally was generated using the ballot data stored in each block.
A comparison between the new tally and the tally generated by the voting machine
was reported on a web page. This audit was conducted for both precincts and the
results were identical to those for the votes cast in each case. See Figure 27 for
the first precinct result and Figure 28 for the second precinct result.
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Figure 24. API automation tool (POSTMAN)
Figure 25. Tally of the first precinct
4.4.2 Ballot Pooling Audit
A ballot pooling audit was also conducted using a Python script. The script
created a random sample of blocks from the precinct’s local chain. For this test,
10% of the blocks in a local chain were selected as the sample size. The script
produced the tally of the sample and used this to project the expected result
for the entire chain. These values were reported on a web page along with the
original machine tally for each precinct. The test was conducted on both precincts
separately, and the result returned by the script provided evidence to support the
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Figure 26. Tally of the second precinct
Figure 27. Ballot level comparison audit, first precinct
validity of votes produced by the tally API. The posted result for each precinct is
shown in Figure 29 and 30.
4.4.3 Batch Level Comparison Audit
This audit was also conducted using a Python script. The tally for each
precinct was produced separately using the script, and the sum of each precinct’s
tally was compared against the combined result of the tally API. The result was
returned as a web page for comparison. The result is shown in Figure 31.
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Figure 28. Ballot level comparison audit, second precinct
Figure 29. Ballot pooling audit, first precinct
4.4.4 Block Removal Audit
A block removal audit was conducted on the second precinct data using a
Python script created for this purpose. First, a random sample of blocks was
selected and these blocks were removed from the local chain. 10% of the total
blocks in the chain were selected as the sample size. Both the tally of votes in
the sample and the tally for the 90% of votes remaining in the local chain are
calculated separately. The sum should agree with the votes cast on the voting
machine. The results are shown in Figures 32 and 33.
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Figure 30. Ballot pooling audit, second precinct
Figure 31. Batch level comparison audit
4.4.5 Block Authenticity Audit
This audit is conducted to check the validity of the data stored in the local
chain. The audit is performed by recalculating the hash for each block and validat-
ing the newly generated hash against the original proof of work used for the block.
Using the proof of work timestamp stored in each local block, the corresponding
nonce value is extracted from the pow list on the central server. Then the hash
of the block is re-calculated and checked against the proof of work. Each block in
the chain is tested using a Python script that returns an error when a mismatch
occurs. The script returns a list of the blocks in error for any mismatches. The
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Figure 32. Block removal audit, first precinct
Figure 33. Block removal audit, second precinct
audit was conducted on the second precinct’s data, and the successful result is
shown in Figure 34.
To test a failure scenario, one hash value in the local chain that was validated
in the previous test was altered. The result is shown in Figure 35.
4.4.6 Block Connectivity Audit
This audit is conducted to check the link between each block on the chain.
An audit script was written to match the previous hash value in each block with
the re-generated hash of the previous block. This test was applied to all of the
blocks in the second precinct’s chain. As with the block authenticity audit, both
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Figure 34. Block authenticity audit, success result
Figure 35. Block authenticity audit, failure result
success and failure scenarios were tested. To test a failure scenario, the hash value
in a block was intentionally altered. The result of the successful scenario shown in
Figure 36 and the failure scenario in Figure 37.
4.4.7 Voter Verification
Due to a change in the design of the QR code for vote verification, this code is
not currently printed on a paper receipt as described in the third chapter. When a
successful ballot is cast online, its QR code is instead displayed on the screen. This
QR code follows the same structure as the printed QR code in the third chapter.
See Figure 38.
51
Figure 36. Block connectivity audit success
Figure 37. Block connectivity audit failure
Each QR code includes a link to the vote verification portal. The QR code
also contains a hash of the four ballot data fields as a hexadecimal string.
To test the voter verification process, a successfully generated QR code was
scanned using a mobile device. This device automatically logged into the voter
verification portal through the link in the QR code. For valid votes, the system
indicates the vote is successfully recorded (Figure 39), and for invalid votes returns
an error (Figure 40).
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Figure 38. Vote verification QR page
Figure 39. Vote verification success
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The main objective of this research is to use features of blockchains and the
notion of proof of work to create an auditable, immutable, and secure voting sys-
tem. The system developed also incorporates, in a unique way, two additional
security technologies. These are the use of zero-knowledge protocols to avoid shar-
ing sensitive information, and end-to-end encrypted communication through the
El-Gamal public-key cryptosystem.
The first mock election showed the Fiat Shamir zero-knowledge protocol to
be a good way for a validator to authenticate itself without sharing any sensitive
information. The procedure uses random numbers and calculations based on keys
generated prior to the election for the authentication. This zero-knowledge proto-
col was tested more than 3000 times in the second and third mock elections. It
successfully authenticated the validators to a central server on all occasions apart
from a few times when the value R (from R = v–Cb) was negative. This issue was
corrected by replacing gR in the equation U = gRBC mod n with the modular
inverse of g−R for negative R values.
if(R > 0) : U = gRBC mod n
else if(R < 0) : U = mod inverse(g−R)BC mod n
An El-Gamal cryptosystem was used to generate secret keys for the validators
and was also used to encrypt information shared between machines. This proved to
be a successful method of achieving end-to-end encrypted communication between
validators and the central server.
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The performance of the proposed proof of work concept was tested and ana-
lyzed in the second mock election. Both the average number of attempts and the
average time to compute a hash in the correct format was measured by increasing
the length of the sequence of 0s in increments of two. The results revealed that
the average number of attempts increased by approximately four times for every
two 0s added to the sequence. The average time also showed an exponential in-
crease for longer length sequences but not for shorter ones. This is mainly due to
the time consumed performing the modular computations in the zero-knowledge
protocol. Based on the results of these tests, a value of 16 was established as a
good compromise for the number of 0s used in the rest of the study.
The final mock election was conducted to replicate an actual election envi-
ronment. Risk-limiting audits, as required by Rhode Island law, were successfully
conducted on more than 2000 ballots in two virtual precincts. In addition, three
new post-election auditing methods were introduced and tested. These new audits
take advantage of the characteristics of blockchains, and cannot be conducted with
the election system currently in place. The resistance of the data in a block to al-
teration was tested with a block authenticity audit. The immutability of the chain
was tested using a block connectivity audit. The paperless audit trail capability
was tested using a block removal audit. The vote verification process was also
tested during the third mock election.
The mock elections demonstrate that the characteristics of blockchains can
be used to create an immutable and secure voting system. By storing the ballot
data inside a blockchain-like data structure, any unauthorized modification to the
data can be detected. The chain also creates an audit trail for each ballot that
can be used in post-election audits. These experiments also demonstrated the
proposed system’s capability to perform several post-election audits including all
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of the risk-limiting audits required by Rhode Island law [1].
One of the major parameters of this study was to introduce as few, if any,
changes to the existing election process. The results of the second mock election
indicate there will be no appreciable delay in the voting process. The time for the
rest of the voting process remains unchanged.
Compared to many of the existing secure voting systems discussed in the
second chapter, the system proposed here requires minimal effort to set up prior
to election day. Moreover, no modification to the current ballot structure or voting
machines used in Rhode Island is required.
Based on these observations, the proposed voting algorithm has clear potential
to be integrated with current voting systems, thereby improving the security and
integrity of elections.
5.1 Future Work
Several possible improvements were identified for both the prototype system
and the underlying algorithm. These would be interesting to pursue as future
work.
5.1.1 Improvements to the Prototype
An important improvement to the prototype would be to conduct mock elec-
tions with multiple validators working simultaneously to generate hashes. This
would provide a better understanding of the performance of the system.
It would also be interesting to conduct an election allowing voters to vote for
more than one candidate and to include more than one contest in the election.
These features would create a much complex value for the “ballot data” field. The
tally API would also need to be modified to accommodate these types of elections.
Finally, it would be interesting to test the prototype with an actual voting
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machine, like the ES&S DS200, instead of an online ballot form to see how the
prototype handles data provided by an actual voting machine.
5.1.2 Improvements to the Algorithm
One important improvement to the algorithm would be to use a single
blockchain for all the validators in an election, instead of having separate local
validators. This might require implementing a consensus mechanism similar to the
bitcoin protocol [2] before adding a block to a validator’s chain.
A second improvement would be the implementation of a private information
retrieval protocol for the voter verification process [3]. This would create a secure
retrieval of information from the blockchain when a voter tried to verify his or
her vote. It would enhance privacy if no one knew the origin of voter verification
requests.
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